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THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT-AN ANALYSIS OF
THE EFFICACY OF FEDERAL WARRANTY
REGULATION AS A CONSUMER PROTECTION
TOOL
Kathleen F. Brickey*
INTRODUCTION
Congressional adoption of the Magnuson-Moss Consumer
Product Warranty Act' signaled the creation of a new consumer
remedy for violation of warranty obligations. One might in-
quire, why has breach of warranty been made a matter of fed-
eral concern? The answer lies in an examination of the nation-
wide scope and impact of consumer transactions involving war-
ranted products.
The consuming public has available a diversity of products
from which to choose. Despite a marked decrease in purchasing
power,2 the volume of consumer product purchases continues
to increase. Durable household items such as appliances and
furniture annually account for $25.5 billion in retail sales.3
These substantial retail figures exclude not only nondurable
household items, wearing apparel and general merchandise,
but also automobiles, whose sales receipts are exceeded only by
those of grocery items.'
In light of the volume of consumer transactions, it would
seem that if there were significant dissatisfaction with con-
sumer products it would be reflected by a decrease in sales.5 On
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville; Visiting Associate Profes-
sor, Washington University, 1977-78; commencing 1978-79 academic year, Associate
Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1965, J.D. 1968, University of Ken-
tucky. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions of Professors Daniel
R. Mandelker and Frank W. Miller of Washington University.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. IV 1974).
2. Between 1965 and 1975 the consumer price index for all commodities, exclud-
ing food, rose 53.9%. During this period the cost of household durables increased by
41.8%. The price of non-durable goods, excluding food and apparel, increased by
63.7%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BuREAu OF THE CENsus, A STATwTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNrrED STATES 423, table 688 (1975). Quantitatively, the consumer is getting less
for his money.
3. Id. at 775, table 1314. The service industry generated by home appliance sales
had receipts totalling more than $2 billion in 1972. Id. at 787, table 1330.
4. In 1974, new car sales grossed more than $90 billion. Id. at 768, Fig. 29.2. Auto
repair industry receipts exceeded $12 billion in 1972. Id. at 787, table 1330.
5. See Warranties and Guaranties: Hearings on H.R. 18056; H.R. 10690, H.R.
73
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the contrary, retailers have largely enjoyed a steady increase in
demand. Nevertheless, this increase does not necessarily sig-
nal that consumer complaints are being resolved successfully
on an informal basis. 7
A significant number of consumer products require repair,
often substantial, while they are relatively new.' Quite natu-
rally, the consumer will refer to the product warranty to deter-
mine whether the warranty is still in force. If the product is
new, he will expect to obtain necessary adjustments without
charge.' It is at this point that the significant consumer prob-
lem begins. The first barrier is one of language. Historically,
12656, and H.R. 16782; H.R. 13390; H.R. 18758, H.R. 19293, and S. 3074 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1970) (statement of George Lamb, Gen. Counsel,
Ass'n of Home Appliance Mfrs.) [hereinafter cited as Warranties Hearings].
6. Despite an escalating number of complaints from disgruntled consumers, new
car sales increased from 6.6 million to 9.4 million between 1960 and 1968. FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE WARRANTIES 6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FTC
REPORT].
7. But see Warranties Hearings, supra note 5, at 129 (statement of J. Edward
Day, Special Counsel, Consumer Elecs. Group, Elec. Indus. Ass'n).
8. A Federal Trade Commission study of automobile warranties and service ob-
served that reliable surveys indicated that approximately 33% of new automobiles were
delivered in unsatisfatory condition. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 31. In 1967, 9% of
new car purchasers reported that their automobiles were mechanically unreliable. Id.
at 30. The Commission noted the tremendous number of automobiles involved in
recalls (4.5 million between Sept. 1, 1966 and Jan. 1, 1968) as substantiating consumer
complaints that new cars not infrequently are delivered from the factory with defects.
Id. at 27-28.
Consumers Union found similar problems with the quality of other types of con-
sumer goods. After purchasing approximately 25 instant-load, automatic-exposure
cameras ranging in price from $30 to $70, the organization discovered that fully one-
half "were not operable or became inoperable" shortly thereafter. One-third of the 15
tape recorders purchased by the organization, costing several hundred dollars each,
were defective. Six percent of the color televisions purchased by consumers in 1968
required replacement of the picture tube before the year was out. Consumer Product
Guaranty Act: Hearings on S. 3074 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1970) (statement of Nat'l Small
Business Ass'n, Appendix, Caveat Emptor-Many People Complain the Quality of
Products is Deteriorating Rapidly, Wall St. J., June 26, 1969, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter
cited as Consumer Product Hearings].
This problem has been documented by a third study conducted by Better Business
Bureaus International (BBB). In July, 1965, BBB surveyed 15 member bureaus con-
cerning appliance repair problems. The conclusions of the survey were based on general
observations of the member bureaus and on 146 specific complaints selected at ran-
dom. Sixty percent of the consumer complaints related to appliances that were less
than one year old. Of those appliances, one-third had been repaired an average of 2.88
times. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DEP'T OF LABOR & SPECIAL ASS'T
TO THE PRESIDENT FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON APPLIANCE
WARRANTIES AND SERVICE 131-32 (1969) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
9. Trebilcock, Manufacturers' Guaranties, 18 McGILL L.J. 1, 29 (1972).
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warranty documents have not accurately conveyed the respec-
tive obligations of the seller and the buyer. A survey of approxi-
mately 300 new car purchasers aptly illustrated this point.,'
When asked to read and explain the disclaimer clause in their
automotive warranties, fewer than half demonstrated a fairly
accurate understanding of the term." Fully one-fourth con-
fessed that the clause was incomprehensible."2 Moreover, ques-
tions concerning other aspects of the warranties elicited respon-
ses which indicated that misunderstanding was not limited to
the legal consequences of a disclaimer, but related to numerous
facets of basic warranty coverage. For example, the correct
response rate ranged from a high of 64% regarding purchaser
understanding of the duration of the warranty to a low of 34%
regarding what maintenance services were required to keep the
warranty in force.' 3 These results indicate that there is a serious
problem regarding the lack of clarity in warranty documents.
This leads to considerable consumer frustration. A purchaser
seeking warranty service may be genuinely surprised to learn
that the warranty covering a defective component has expired
or that the particular component was never covered by the
warranty; that the warranty does not cover damage to the prod-
uct caused by a defective warranted part; or that he will have
to pay substantial labor or transportation costs in connection
with obtaining the "free replacement" of a defective part.
Rather than a document which extends a benefit to the pur-
chaser, a written warranty is frequently a limitation of rights
which might otherwise accrue under an implied warranty.
The next hurdle is the problem of obtaining warranty serv-
ice which actually is due the consumer. 14 There is an abund-
ance of complaints about poor service on products under war-
ranty. 5 The problem has been particularly acute in the auto-
10. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado
About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 83, 144.
11. Id. at 146.
12. Id. at 147. In a similar survey of first-year law students, approximately 50%
demonstrated some awareness of the meaning of the disclaimer clause. Id. at 147 n.200.
13. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automo-
bile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006, 1055.
14. The Presidential Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service reported
that consumers may experience substantial delays in obtaining service on relatively
new appliances. Manufacturers' concentration on production and distribution of new
models often means sacrificing early availability of repair parts or components and of
parts and service manuals. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7-8.
15. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 35-38. A National Association of Fleet Admin-
istrators survey concluded that 26% of all warranty repairs require repeated visits. Id.
at 36.
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mobile industry, in which warranty competition briefly was
equated with sales competition. Widely advertised increased
warranty coverage seemed to stimulate consumer interest and
to influence the share of the market held by some companies. 6
Another result of this competition was increased consumer ex-
pectation regarding the performance of automobiles carrying
greater warranty coverage. Unfortunately, the warranties ac-
companied basically the same product with which more lim-
ited warranties had been associated. The automobiles did not
perform significantly better. When the purchasers' expecta-
tions were disappointed, there followed an increased number of
complaints and a burgeoning number of demands for warranty
service. The new marketing technique simply generated in-
creased warranty service on new cars over a longer period of
obligation and at greater cost to the manufacturer. 7 As a
United States Senator stated in dismay, when one manufac-
turer detected an alarming increase in the cost of warranty
service, "instead of going to the design engineers, the assembly
line managers and asking them to produce a better more relia-
ble product to improve [its] competitive position, the general
manager asked the dealer to cut back on his warranty work. '"'
Put simply, the few promises made in written warranties fre-
quently have been broken. Consumers have lacked an effective
and efficient method of enforcing their warranty rights.
Federal interest in warranty problems was evident in 1965,
when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiated its inves-
16. Id. at 24. When Chrysler introduced the 5 year/50,000 mile power train war-
ranty in 1963, its sales increased by 40% and its share of new car sales increased from
9.6% to 12.4%.
17. The FTC staff concluded that while warranty costs substantially exceeded
the anticipated level, those costs did not seem "to have impinged appreciably on the
manufacturers' profits. But they do represent a cost and the manufacturers try to
hold them down." FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON AUToMoBILE WARRANTIES
161 (1968).
18. Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8, at 27 (statement of Sen. Hart).
An interesting series of correspondence, which is reproduced in the printed hearings,
provoked this comment. Id. at 28.32. An anonymous Chevrolet dealer sent to a member
of the Committee a letter from Chevrolet to all of its dealers which cited the alarming
increase in warranty costs. Among other suggestions, the letter stated: "Unless a safety
defect is discovered, no warranty work is to be performed unless requested by the
customer and needed." Id. at 29. In response to an inquiry, Chevrolet wrote Senator
Moss and explained that the dealer had misinterpreted the fair import of the state-
ment. Id. at 31-32. A "revised letter superseding [the] earlier letter" was sent to all
dealers in order to clarify the matter. Id. at 30. Chevrolet was suggesting only that
dealers should refrain from performing unnecessary service. The revised letter rechar-
acterized the "alarming increases" in the cost of warranty service as "rapidly rising
costs." Id. at 31.
[Vol. 18
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tigation into consumer complaints about automobile warranty
service. The Commission issued a highly critical report in
1970.19 The study revealed that quality control was rapidly de-
teriorating and that automobile warranties and service there-
under were inadequate.?° Since the industry response was per-
ceived as "insufficient to protect the public," the FTC recom-
mended that warranty and quality control standards for the
industry be established by governmental action.2 ' The preced-
ing year a special Presidential task force on appliance warran-
ties" reported that despite the appliance industry's knowledge
of numerous problems with major appliance warranties, it had
done little or nothing to correct the situation." The task force
speculated that the reluctance of manufacturers to take correc-
tive action was partially attributable to competitive forces, and
it recommended governmental leadership to assist industry in
eliminating abuses.24
Despite these abuses, congressional response was neither
swift nor sure. Over a four-year period numerous bills were
authored and four sets of hearings were held, to deal with the
problems relating to warranty obligations.25 Faced with the
19. FTC REPORT, supra note 6.
20. Id. at 68.
21. Id.
22. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8. The Task Force was appointed by Presi-
dent Johnson. Some of the conclusions contained in the report are incorporated in the
legislative history of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1974),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7709-11 [hereinafter cited
without parallel citation as HousE REPORT].
23. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 101. The appliance warranties were
difficult to understand and, sometimes deceptively captioned or advertised. Moreover,
it was found that the warranties contained unfair exceptions and exclusions and that
warrantors frequently failed to honor fully their obligations. Id. at 103-05.
24. Id. at 101. There are some who claim that federal participation in the free
enterprise system has fostered an unhealthy competitive posture and has performed a
disservice to consumers. Deterioration in the quality of goods produced has been
blamed, in part, on an economic regulatory policy which encourages making available
a greater variety of goods at a cheaper price. An antitrust policy that deprives the
producer of control over the marketing of its products, particularly with regard to price
and retail channels, effectively causes a product to compete with itself. This policy
rewards mass merchandisers and discounters who stimulate sales by cutting prices.
The resulting market pressures contribute to the production of more cheap goods
rather than products of higher quality. Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8, at
120-21 (statement of Nat'l Small Business Ass'n). It has been argued that consumers
should be disabused of the notion that they will benefit from more regulation.
25. Warranties Hearings, supra note 5; Consumer Product Hearings, supra note
8; Consumer Warranty Protection; Hearings on H.R. 6313, H. R. 6314, H. R. 261, H. R.
4809, H.R. 5037, H.R. 10673 (and similar and identical bills) Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Warranty Protection Hearingsl;
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conflicting options of mandatory quality standards for con-
sumer products,"6 requiring that consumer products be war-
ranted, 7 and leaving unregulated competitive market forces
that presumably work to provide the greatest variety of con-
sumer choices,"s Congress devised and adopted an intermediate
level of intervention. The result was the Magnuson-Moss Con-
sumer Product Warranty Act.2" The Act establishes a regula-
tory scheme that relies primarily on disclosure as a consumer
protection tool.3 0 This disclosure mechanism is supplemented
by provisions imposing minimum obligations on those giving
Consumer Warranty Protection-1973 Hearings on H.R. 20 H.R. 5021 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Warranty Protection
Hearings].
26. The Federal Trade Commission concluded that the only effective method of
protecting purchasers of automobiles was federal adoption of minimum quality stan-
dards. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 68.
27. Congress previously had rejected the mandatory warranty alternative. Two
bills introduced in 1967, would have required that automobile and appliance warran-
ties be given and would have subjected those warranties to extensive regulation. S.
2727 & S. 2728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Each was read twice and reported to the
Commerce Committee. 113 CONG. REc. 35281, 35284 (1967). Neither was reported out
of committee. See generally Comment, Consumer Protection and Warranties of Qual-
ity: A Proposal for a Statutory Warranty in Sales to Consumers, 34 ALB. L. REV. 339
(1970).
28. See Warranties Hearings, supra note 5, at 110 (statement of J. Edward Day,
Spec. Counsel, Consumer Elecs. Group, Elec. Indus. Ass'n).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. IV 1974) (eff. July 4, 1975). See generally
Denicola, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Making Consumer Product Warranty a
Federal Case, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 273 (1975); Kovac, Magnuson-Moss vs. State Pro-
tective Consumer Legislation: the Validity of a Stricter State Standard of Warranty
Protection, 30 ARK. L. Rav. 21 (1976); Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act:
Does It Balance Warrantor and Consumer Interests?, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335
(1976); Saxe & Blejwas, The Federal Warranty Act: Progress and Pitfalls, 22 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 1 (1976); Strasser, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: An Overview and
Comparison with UCC Coverage, Disclaimer, and Remedies in Consumer Warranties,
27 MERcER L. REv. 1111 (1976); Note, Consumer Product Warranties-The FTC Steps
In, 9 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PRoc. 887 (1976); Comment, The Federal Consumer
Warranty Act and Its Effect on State Law, 43 TENN. L. Rv. 429 (1976); Note, The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act: Protecting
Consumers Through Product Warranties, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163 (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. IV 1974). In the absence of a disclosure require-
ment, the seller is free to provide no information to consumers about warranted prod-
ucts. Alternatives to the disclosure approach embodied in the Magnuson-Moss legisla-
tion include governmental assumption of the obligation to inform consumers. That
obligation could be accomplished by publication of information compiled by various
governmental agencies or by initiation of a governmental product testing program, the
results of which would be published. See Rhoades, Reducing Consumer Ignorance: An
Approach and Its Effect, 20 ANTITRUST BuLL. 309, 314-15 (1975) (consumer information
about products would increase competition and eventually result in higher quality
products).
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warranties governed by the Act,' granting rulemaking 2 and
enforcement powers to the Federal Trade Commission,33 and
creating a consumer cause of action.34
The Act is designed to rectify the previous identified prob-
lems with consumer warranties. Foremost among these prob-
lems is consumer deception. The disclosure rules promulgated
under the Act are intended to prevent deception by requiring
a clear statement of the terms and conditions of warranty cov-
erage. 5 Disclosure also was perceived as a vehicle for improving
the adequacy of information made available to consumers" and
promoting more meaningful competition in the marketing of
consumer products.37 Of equal importance is the Act's prohibi-
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV 1974).
32. Id. § 2303(b).
33. Title II of the Act, id. §§ 45, 46, 56 (Supp. 111973), is devoted to strengthen-
ing the enforcement powers of the Federal Trade Commission and is beyond the scope
of this article. See Note, The Magnuson-Moss Amendments to the Federal Trade
Commission Act: Improvements or Broken Promises? 61 IOWA L. REV. 222 (1975), for
a discussion of the history of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the past ineffective-
ness of the Commission, and the expansion of FTC enforcement powers under Title II
of the Act.
34. The Act creates a cause of action for damages which may be pursued by any
consumer who suffers damage as the result of a warrantor's failure to comply with the
requirements of the Act or to comply with his obligations under a warranty. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). If, however, a warrantor has established an informal
dispute settlement mechanism and has provided in the warranty that resort to the
informal procedure is a condition precedent to pursuing any legal remedy under the
Act, the consumer must first attempt to resolve the dispute within the framework of
that mechanism. Id. § 2310(a)(3). See generally Note, Consumer Protection: The Fed-
eral Trade Commission Rule for Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Promul-
gated Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act, Neglects the Commercial Incentive Necessary to Secure Adoption, 49 TEMP.
L.Q. 459 (1976).
A civil action under the Act may be filed in either state or federal court, but there
are several hurdles that must be leaped before breach of warranty becomes a federal
case. The amount in controversy must be at least $50,000, each individual claim must
be at least $25, and the warrantor must have been afforded a reasonable opportunity
to cure his noncompliance. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3), (e) (Supp. IV 1974). Consumer class
actions are authorized, but there are additional barriers to federal litigation in this
context. It must be established that the claim of each member of the class is not less
than $25 and that the number of named plaintiffs equals not less than one hundred.
Id. § 2310(d)(3).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
36. Several factors have been identified as contributing to the prevalence of
consumer ignorance: (1) the increasing number and complexity of consumer products;
(2) the cost inefficiency of providing information; and (3) the desire to acquire or retain
oligopoly power which tends to result from consumer ignorance. "Since consumer
ignorance tends to yield and maintain profits above the competitive level, the argu-
ment frequently given that much of the advertising of the private sector is designed to
persuade, rather than inform seems plausible." Rhoades, supra note 30, at 310-11.
37. Id.
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tion against disclaimer of implied warranties,38 which is also
intended to prevent deception." That prohibition is combined
with provisions limiting the inclusion of other unfair terms and
conditions of warranty coverage" in an attempt to equalize the
bargaining positions of warrantors and consumers and to im-
prove competition. Finally, the Act endeavors to ensure that
consumers have available effective recourse for breach of war-
ranty obligations by providing an operable private enforcement
mechanism .41
This article focuses on the key provisions of the Act which
are important to the accomplishment of its goals. The analysis
scrutinizes the underlying policy decisions supporting the legis-
lative approach, the lack of clarity in the statutory language,
and the problems posed by the regulatory response to the legis-
lation. Finally, within this framework, this article assesses the
viability of the Act as a vehicle for achieving its stated objec-
tives.
THE SCOPE OF STATUTORY REGULATION
The Act governs obligations incurred in connection with
the sale of consumer products. The term consumer product
includes tangible personal property which is normally used for
personal, family or household purposes, and it also extends to
certain products intended to be attached to or installed in real
property.2
38. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (Supp. IV 1974).
39. See text accompanying notes 118-120 infra.
40. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 113-115 infra.
41. See note 34 supra. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this newly created
consumer remedy is the authorization of recovery of costs and attorneys' fees by pre-
vailing consumer plaintiffs, unless the court determines that the award of attorneys'
fees is inappropriate. This feature may make feasible the litigation of relatively small
claims involving difficult problems of proof and relatively large legal fees.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (Supp. IV 1974). The FTC has provided a rule of thumb
as guidance for determining whether fixtures will be considered consumer products.
Goods which are affixed to realty at the time of sale will be considered consumer
products if they have a separate function apart from the realty. Included in this
category of products are appliances such as dishwashers, ranges, furnaces, water heat-
ers, and the like. [1976] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,245. Products such as roofing,
wiring, ductwork and plumbing which have no separate function apart from the realty
will be included or excluded from the definition of consumer product depending on the
character of the sales transaction. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,115 (1977) (to be codified in
16 C.F.R. § 700.1). Building materials and products which are integral components of
a structure at the time of sale are not consumer products. On the other hand, if a
consumer purchases such goods over the counter from a building supply company or
contracts for their purchase in connection with home improvement, repair or modifica-
tion, they are consumer products. See Peters, How the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
[Vol. 18
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In addition to restricting the right to include onerous terms
and conditions in written warranties, the regulatory scheme
requires those who make express written warranties to provide
sufficient information to enable consumers to understand their
warranty rights."
Designation Requirements
Any warrantor who gives a written warranty on a product
that actually costs the consumer more than $10 is obligated to
designate the warranty as either "full" or "limited."'44 A full
warranty is one that meets minimum federal standards, and it
must be designated "Full (statement of duration) Warranty." 5
Any person making a full warranty is required to repair or
replace, without charge, a defective or nonconforming product
or part covered by the warranty, or to refund the purchase
price. 6 If a product still malfunctions after a reasonable num-
ber of attempts to remedy defects, the consumer is entitled to
elect a refund or free replacement of the product or part.47 The
Affects the Builder/Seller of New Housing, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 338 (1977).
Not surprisingly, this aspect of the legislation has generated some consternation
among homebuilders and home improvement companies. Their resistance may derive
largely from the relatively recent development of home owners warranty coverage for
new homes and home care contracts for older housing. Each of these undertakings
includes some obligation with regard to goods which fit within the definition of con-
sumer products. In the case of the home owners warranty, this means that the home-
builder must comply with the disclosure and designation requirements of the Act. In
the case of home care contracts, the contractor must comply with any disclosure
requirements which the Commission promulgates for service contracts. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 2306(a) (Supp. IV 1974). The FTC has asserted that the Home Owners Warranty
Corporation has actively sought legislation which would exempt it from the coverage
of the Act. (1976] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,245.
43. See text accompanying notes 128-137 infra (discussing the prohibition
against disclaimer of implied warranties); text accompanying notes 97-106 infra
(discussing the prohibition against preconditioning full warranty coverage on the con-
sumer's assumption of onerous obligations).
The Act also prohibits a warrantor from conditioning the warranty on the con-
sumer's using a particular brand of article or service in connection with the warranted
product. The Commission is authorized to permit such a tie-in arrangement if it is
satisfied that the product in question will function properly only if another particular
product or service is used in connection with it and if it determines that a waiver of
the prohibition would be in the public interest. Public comment must be permitted
prior to making such a waiver, and the Commission must publish its disposition and
justification in the Federal Register. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (Supp. IV 1974). A warrantor
who provides an article or service without charge may condition his warranty on the
consumer's acceptance of that article or service. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (Supp. IV 1974).
45. Id. §§ 2303(a)(1), 2304(a).
46. Id. §§ 2304(a)(1), 2301(10).
47. Id. § 2304(a)(4).
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duty to repair or replace under a full warranty runs to every
person who is a consumer of the warranted product,48 and that
duty may not be qualified by imposing unreasonable require-
ments on the consumer .4
Full warrantors are prohibited from disclaiming, modify-
ing or limiting the duration of implied warranties,5 but they
may limit or exclude consequential damages for breach of ex-
press and implied warranties if the limitation or exclusion con-
spicuously appears on the face of the warranty." Full warran-
ties must, of course, comply with the disclosure requirements
of the Act.
The statutory obligations imposed on those giving warran-
ties that do not meet the federal minimum standards are fewer
in number. Any such warranty must be designated "Limited
Warranty" and must comply with the disclosure rules. 2 Al-
though limited warrantors may not disclaim or modify implied
warranties, they may limit the duration of such warranties. 3
No obligation of free repair or replacement is imposed on those
making limited warranties, nor are there any proscriptions
against preconditioning limited warranty coverage on the con-
sumer's assumption of duties such as returning the product to
the factory.
Products may be sold with both full and limited warranties
so long as the warranties are differentiated clearly and conspic-
uously. 4 For example, a refrigerator might be sold with a full
one year compressor warranty and a limited six month war-
ranty against defects in material and workmanship in other
components of the unit. If the compressor proved to be defec-
tive within the one year period of warranty coverage, the seller
would be obligated to repair or replace it free of charge to the
purchaser. If some other part evidenced defects within the ini-
tial six months of use, the warrantor would be required to rem-
edy the defect in accordance with the terms of the warranty,
but he could exclude from his obligation the cost of labor in-
volved in remedying the defect.
48. Id. § 2304(b)(4). See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(1)(b) (Supp. IV 1974). See text accompanying notes 97-106
infra.
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2308(a), 2304(2) (Supp. IV 1974).
51. Id. § 2304(a)(3). See text accompanying notes 184-188 infra.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2303(a)(2), 2302 (Supp. IV 1974).
53. Id. § 2308(b). See text accompanying notes 130-137 infra.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 2305 (Supp. IV 1974).
[Vol. 18
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Disclosure Requirements
The Federal Trade Commission is charged with the re-
sponsibility of implementing the Act. Central to discharging
that responsibility is the power to require disclosure of terms
and conditions of warranty coverage. The disclosure rules pro-
mulgated by the Commission require designation of the parties
who may enforce the warranty and of the parts of the product
that are covered by the warranty; identification of the remedy
to which the consumer is entitled in the event of nonconformity
and a statement of how that remedy may be obtained; disclo-
sure of any limitations on implied warranties or of incidental
or consequential damages; and a statement of the date of
commencment of warranty coverage if it is other than the date
of purchase. 5 The disclosure rules apply only to products ac-
tually costing the consumer more than $15.00.11
In its basic framework then, the Act purports to regulate
the terms and conditions of both express and implied warran-
ties. In order to accurately assess the efficacy of the Act as a
consumer remedy, the regulatory approach to each type of war-
ranty must be examined.
REGULATION OF WRITTEN EXPRESS WARRANTIES
Disclosure in Consumer Product Warranties
When disclosure is required. The designation and disclo-
sure requirements of the Act are applicable only when a written
warranty has been given,57 and there is no requirement that
consumer products be warranted. The term "written warranty"
includes any affirmation of fact or promise that: (1) the mate-
rial or workmanship in a specified product is defect free; (2) the
product will meet a specified level of performance for a speci-
55. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (1977).
56. Id. The Act authorizes the Commission to promulgate disclosure rules that
are applicable to written warranties accompanying products actually costing the con-
sumer more than $5. 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (Supp. IV 1974).
57. The Senate bill authorized recovery under the Act for breach of an express
oral warranty, but this provision was deleted by the conferees to conform to a House
amendment. S. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7755, 7758 [hereinafter cited without parallel citation as
SENATE REPORT]. This decision evidently was based upon the belief that at present
there are no significant consumer problems with regard to this type of obligation.
Moreover, attempted regulation of written and oral warranties in the context of a single
statutory mechanism was deemed awkward at best. The conference report did, how-
ever, express the caveat that Congress "would re-examine the issue if oral express
warranties became more prevalent." Id.
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fled period of time; or (3) the warrantor will take remedial
action if the product does not conform to the terms of the
warranty.5" Many representations that would constitute ex-
press warranties under state law will be excluded from the
designation and disclosure requirements of the federal act.59
Energy efficiency ratings for electrical appliances, care labeling
of garments, and comparable product information are exam-
ples of exempted affirmations0 Similarly, representations that
58. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (Supp. IV 1974). As is the case under the Uniform
Commerical Code, a representation must become part of the basis of the bargain in
order to constitute an enforceable warranty obligation. While the federal act does not
further refine the concept, some guidance may be found in the official comments to
the UCC.
[A]ffirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bar-
gain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no
particular reliance on such statements needs to be shown in order to
weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is
to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear
affirmative proof.
U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 3. The interpretation adopted by the Commission is that
warranties which are not intended to be conveyed to the consumer nor to be brought
to his attention are outside the coverage of the Act. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,116 (1977)
(to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(c)). A component supplier's warranty to a manufac-
turer of consumer goods does not become part of the basis of the consumer's bargain
and is exempt. On the other hand, a component supplier may make a written warranty
to the consumer which is conveyed through another seller. The Commission has used
as an example, a refrigerator carrying a consumer warranty and which is installed in
a boat. In this instance, the warranty runs to the purchaser of the boat and is within
the scope of the Act.
59. Under U.C.C. § 2-313, any affirmation of fact or promise, which relates to
the goods and which becomes part of the basis of the bargain, is sufficient to create
an expess warranty.
60. The Act exempts from the bulk of its provisions any disclosure which is
otherwise governed by federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(d) (Supp. IV 1974). The specific
examples cited in the text are typical of those which likely will fall within this exemp-
tion. See FTC Trade Regulation Rule, Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel, 16
C.F.R. § 423.1 (1977); Department of Commerce Procedures for a Voluntary Labeling
Program for Household Appliances and Equipment to Effect Energy Conservation, 15
C.F.R. §§ 9.0 -. 11 (1977). The sole provision of the Act which applies to such written
affirmations is § 2302(c), which prohibits conditioning them on the consumer's using
a particular brand of article or service in connection with the product. See note 43
supra.
Several other exemptions are worthy of note. Written representations which are
expressions of general policy concerning consumer satisfaction and which are not sub-
ject to specific limitations are excluded from §§ 2303-2304 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §
2303(b) (Supp. IV 1974). But see 42 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,116 (1977) (to be codified in
16 C.F.R. § 700.5(b)). Moreover, certain terms and conditions of sale, such as a term
permitting a customer to exchange a product within a specified period of time will
not be considered to be a written warranty for purposes of the Act. Id. at 36,115 (to be
codified in 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(b)). The Commission has advised sellers who employ such
practices that the relevant terms should be stated separately from any warranty given
in connection with the sale, and that these terms should not be characterized as
warranties. Id. at 36,116.
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a fabric has been treated with a flame retardant or that paint
will not peel are beyond the scope of the definition.
Shortcomings of disclosure. The restricted approach of the
Act raises fundamental questions regarding the wisdom of se-
lecting disclosure as the primary mechanism for achieving the
stated legislative goals. That the threshold definition was nar-
rowly drafted may be explained by concern about the potential
negative impact of broader application of the disclosure re-
quirements. Disclosure of product information should be en-
couraged in advertising and labeling, and imposition of bur-
densome requirements that must be satisfied when such infor-
mation is supplied might tend to discourage disclosure of useful
data.' In short, the mechanics of compliance with disclosure
rules may provide a disincentive to making disclosures gov-
erned by them."
The congressional decision to narrowly limit the applica-
bility of the Act leaves unaffected numerous representations
that may serve as an inducement to purchase. Compliance
with federal requirements may be avoided by making represen-
tations that are universally regarded as warranties under state
law but that do not fit within the federal statutory definition
of written warranty. In this respect, the legislation does nothing
to prevent consumer deception or to provide a remedy in the
event that product characteristics are misrepresented.
A more basic problem inherent in the statutory approach
relates to the substance of required disclosures when written
warranties are given. Curiously, the Act mandates disclosure of
only two warranty terms: limitation or exclusion of consequen-
tial damages" and limitation of the duration of implied war-
ranties. 4 Full disclosure of other terms and conditions of war-
ranty coverage is called for only "to the extent required by rules
61. See 41 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,115 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a)).
62. It has been noted that advertising of interest rates has decreased significantly
since the disclosure requirements of the Truth-in-Lending Act became effective.
"Clearly, the drafters of the statute did not intend this result; the disclosure require-
ments of the Act were designed to supply consumers with more information, not less."
Thain, Credit Advertising and the Law: Truth in Lending and Related Matters, 1976
WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 275. Professor Thain suggests that a requirement of compulsory
disclosure of interest rates in all credit advertising would be more likely to promote
the legislative goals.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1974). The statutory requirement that this
term be disclosed clearly and conspicuously is limited to full warranties only. Id.
64. Id. § 2308(b). Since full warranties are prohibited from limiting the duration
of implied warranties, this requirement is applicable to limited warranties only. See
id. § 2304(a)(2).
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of the Commission."" The disclosure rules promulgated by the
FTC" closely parallel the non-exclusive statutory list of items
that it may require to be disclosed."7 The rules require a clear
statement of what is covered by a warranty and what the re-
spective obligations of the seller and consumer are in the event
of a product malfunction. Neither the statute nor the rules
require disclosure of meaningful information that would enable
consumers to evaluate the risks associated with cost benefits."
In the absence of information regarding the anticipated level
of product performance and cost of repair, consumers are un-
able to determine whether increased warranty coverage is likely
to provide benefits commensurate with the cost of the coverage.
For example, of fifteen black and white portable televi-
sions rated by Consumers Union, ten had identical warran-
ties." Ranging in price from $105 to $160, these sets carried a
twelve month parts and three month labor warranty. Of the
remaining televisions, three had identical twelve month parts
and labor warranties.These sets ranged in price from $100 to
$125. All of the warranties conditioned coverage upon return of
the set to an authorized dealer or prepaid shipment to the
factory in the event of malfunction. The seven top rated sets
were evaluated as providing comparable performance, and
each was within one of the described warranty categories.
In light of these facts, can a consumer make an informed
judgment about the reliability of the product and the effective-
ness of the warranty? Assuming a price conscious purchaser,
the least expensive model with the longest warranty might
seem the most attractive alternative. In this case, the purchase
price would be $100 and the television would have a twelve
month parts and service warranty. On the other hand, the
manufacturer of this set has only 3,500 authorized service out-
lets as opposed to the 15,000 outlets authorized to service an-
other highly rated set, 0 which sells for $20 more but carries the
65. Id. § 2302(a).
66. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1977). See text accompanying note 55 supra.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. IV 1974). This provision lists 13 categories of
items that may be required to be disclosed, among which are the following: the identity
of the warrantor; the identity of the parties who may enforce the warranty; the parts
of the product that are covered and the parts that are excluded from warranty cover-
age; the availability of informal as well as formal legal methods of resolving disputes;
and, the steps that consumers should take in order to obtain warranty service.
68. Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 19; Note, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act:
Consumer Information and Warranty Regulation, 51 IND,. L.J. 397 (1976).
69. CONSUMER REPORTS, March 1977, at 158.
70. MONEY, March 1977, at 50. In all likelihood, this information will not be
[Vol. 18
1978] MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT 87
three month service warranty. Warranty service for the former
may cost the purchaser a considerable amount in light of ship-
ment charges which may be incurred if the purchaser does not
happen to live in close proximity to an authorized service facil-
ity. The purchaser lacks adequate information to assess the
risk that a warranted part (or parts) will require replacement
or repair during the nine month period in which the service
warranties differ;" to evaluate the relative costs of shipment
and anticipated labor charges; and to weigh the risk and costs
against the $20 differential in purchase price. The purchasing
decision will be more difficult if the product carries both full
and limited warranties."
Thus, while the disclosure requirements probably will pre-
vent deceptions which stem from unarticulated terms and con-
ditions of warranty coverage, it is doubtful that they will pro-
vide the incentive to make available product information that
enables consumers to make meaningful choices. Marketing
competition predicated largely upon price differentials, and to
a lesser extent upon minor differences in warranty coverage, is
not necessarily beneficial to the consumer in the absence of
information relating to performance characteristics and the
disclosed in the warranty document. Although the warrantor must make available
information regarding the location of authorized service representatives, it is not re-
quired that this be accomplished at the point of sale. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(5) (1977).
71. Disclosure of the duration of the warranty in terms of usage measurement
rather than time would assist the consumer in making this type of assessment. Al-
though most manufacturers of major household appliances can estimate the average
useful life of their products, "they [are] unanimous in opposing the publication of
such estimates, even when based on exacting durability tests." TASK FoRCE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 140. Manufacturers' objections are attributed to concern that provid-
ing such information could mislead consumers and give rise to implied warranty prob-
lems.
On May 25, 1976, the Department of Commerce proposed procedures for creating
and implementing a voluntary consumer product information labeling program. On
the basis of comments and testimony received in connection with its proposals, the
Department concluded that need for such a program existed. Consumers were per-
ceived to be unable "to make rational and accurate marketplace decisions because of
the lack of comparative, easily comprehensible information at the point of sale on
important product performance characteristics." 42 Fed. Reg. 26,647 (1977). As a
consequence, the Department instituted a limited pilot program to make available
demonstrably important consumer product information that can be measured objec-
tively and reported in understandable terms. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. Part 16).
Since a majority of the trade associations and manufacturers of mechanical and elec-
tronic products opposed the program, it remains to be seen whether this effort will
provide greater incentive for improving the quality of product information made avail-
able to consumers than does the Magnuson-Moss Act.
72. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
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cost of repair.73 The primary benefit derived from the disclosure
requirements relates to post-contract events. The consumer
must be advised of the steps he must take to perfect his reme-
dial rights if a written warranty has been given. While this
information enables a consumer to "maximize his gain from
the contract,"74 the preceding discussion illustrates that the
gain may be marginal.7"
Regulated and Protected Parties
Warrantors and consumers. In sharp contrast with its nar-
row definition of the threshold term "written warranty," the
Act provides relatively expansive definitions of those who may
incur and enforce warranty obligations. The term "warrantor"
is defined as including any supplier" or other person who gives
or offers to give a written warranty or who is obligated under
an implied warranty.77 Despite pleas to give this basic statutory
term its "historic and accepted" meaning,"8 an amendment
that would have defined warrantor in such a manner that third
party guarantors would be excluded from the Act's coverage
was defeated." The definition clearly includes parties outside
the distributive chain who undertake to provide a remedy in
the event of a product malfunction ° An example of a third
party guarantee is the Good Housekeeping Seal, which prom-
ises replacement or a refund of the purchase price if an ap-
proved product proves to be defective. It is clear that this un-
73. A color television warranty covering transistors for 10 years may give a
slightly higher priced product a competitive edge. That warranty may provide only
marginal benefits to the purchaser, as transistors "cost next to nothing to replace."
MONEY, March 1977, at 51.
74. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 400, 464.
75. In addition to the problems discussed in the text, a common consumer com-
plaint is that parts that most frequently break down are the most expensive and the
least adequately covered by warranties. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 128.
76. "Supplier" is defined as any person who is in the business of making con-
sumer products available to consumers directly or indirectly. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)
(Supp. IV 1974).
77. Id. § 2301(5). The conference report made clear that if a person would be
deemed to have made a written affirmation of fact, promise or undertaking under state
law, he would have done so for purposes of the federal legislation. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 57, at 27.
78. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 90 (Reps. Preyer & McCollister).
79. House consideration of H.R. 7917, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. RE c. 31727
(1974).
80. See Magnuson, Fair Disclosure in the Marketplace of Warranty Prom-
ises-Truth in Warranties for Consumers, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 117, 136 (1975).
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dertaking may influence the purchasing decision as much as a
manufacturer's warranty. Consequently, rules designed to pre-
vent deception and provide access to information regarding the
enforcement of obligations should be applicable to both.8
The statutory definition of the term "consumer" is equally
broad; it has considerably expanded express and implied war-
ranty protection beyond the original purchaser. The definition
includes buyers, transferees who acquire the product during
the term of an express or implied warranty, and other persons
who are entitled by the terms of either the warranty or state
law to enforce warranty obligations. 2 Senator Magnuson
viewed the definition as a designation of the scope of the war-
ranty obligation: "The intent of the definition is to make clear
that the supplier is not entitled to specify which classes of
people may enforce the obligations of the warranty or service
contract so long as the product is transferred during the term
of the warranty or service contract . ".8.."3 Read literally, this
explanation is an overstatement of what actually was accom-
plished, although there were staunch advocates of this position.
The Federal Trade Commission steadfastly maintained that
warranties should run with the product and should be transfer-
able to subsequent owners. 4 As Senator Hart noted, a pur-
chaser who invests $250 for a new automobile transmission
"loses a substantial part of that investment if his guarantee is
worthless to the next owner."85
Notwithstanding that loss of bargain, the federal legisla-
tion permits some warranty obligations to be limited in scope.
81. The FTC promulgated a rule that partially exempts from the disclosure
requirements third party guarantors. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(b) (1977). As long as organiza-
tions furnishing seals of approval state only general policy promising remedial action
on the seals, the emblems themselves need not disclose the information required to be
included in warranty documents. The exemption is subject to the proviso that the
organizations publish the disclosures in each issue of a publication with a general
circulation and make available the disclosures upon request free of charge. This rule
recognizes the value of the services rendered by sponsoring organizations such as Good
Housekeeping, but the Commission indicated that the staff should monitor the impact
of the rule and make any recommendations regarding necessary or desirable changes.
40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,179 (1975). The propriety of this exemption has been questioned
in light of the legislative history surrounding third party warrantors. See Strasser,
supra note 29, at 1116.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (Supp. IV 1974). The definition excludes buyers who
purchase goods for the purpose of resale.
83. Magnuson, supra note 80, at 138.
84. See Warranties Hearings, supra note 5, at 72; 1971 Warranty Protection
Hearings, supra note 25, at 196 (statement of Miles Kirkpatrick, FTC Chairman).
85. Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8, at 25 (statement of Sen. Hart).
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While the Act provides that the duties of a warrantor who gives
a full warranty extend to all persons who are consumers with
respect to the product,"6 there is no similar expression of the
scope of the obligation assumed by one who gives only a limited
warranty. It is implicit that such a warrantor may limit those
to whom he owes a duty.8 7
The regulatory response. The FTC promulgated a disclo-
sure rule that applies when a limited warranty does not extend
to all consumers of the product. As originally proposed, the rule
would have required the warrantor to specify the parties to
whom the warranty ran and, where applicable, to indicate any
limitations on the enforceability of the warranty by parties
other than the first purchaser at retail.8 The rule was subse-
quently revised to require such disclosures only when the en-
forceability of the warranty is limited to the consumer pur-
chaser or to persons other than every consumer owner during
the warranty term.89 The Commission noted that "under Sec-
tions 104(b)(4) and 101(3) of the Act, a warrantor offering a full
warranty is precluded from limiting warranty coverage to the
first purchaser."I"
In a startling turn of events, the Commission later adopted
a contradictory interpretation that allows a full warranty to be
extended only to the first purchaser of a product. This result
may be accomplished by designating the duration of the war-
ranty as the period of time during which the first purchaser
owns the product: e.g., "full warranty for as long as you own
your car."'" The rationale underlying the interpretation is that
sections 104(b)(4) and 101(3) merely prohibit a full warranty
from expressly restricting the warranty rights of a transferee
during the stated term of the warranty. If the warrantor has by
definition limited the duration of the warranty to the length of
time the original purchaser owns the product, there can be no
violation of the Act because "[n]o rights of a subsequent
transferee are cut off as there is no transfer of ownership 'during
86. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1974).
87. The FTC is authorized to promulgate rules requiring disclosure of the ident-
ity of the parties to whom coverage is extended. Id. § 2302(a)(2).
88. Proposed Rules § 701.3(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 29,892, 29,893 (1975).
89. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(1) (1977). The decision was responsive to industry's
position that in the absence of language to the contrary, a consumer would assume that
there were no restrictions on who could enforce the warranty. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168,
60,172 (1975).
90. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,172 n.48 (1975).
91. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,116 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 700.6(b)).
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the duration of (any) warranty.' "92
This reasoning defies logic. Section 104(b)(4) does not
merely prohibit express or implied limitation of the scope of the
warranty. It imposes an affirmative obligation. "The duties
under [a full warranty] extend from the warrantor to each
person who is a consumer with respect to the consumer prod-
uct."93 Moreover, the assertion that limitation of the duration
of a written warranty to the period during which the first pur-
chaser owns the product precludes transfer of ownership
"during the duration of (any) warranty" is clearly wrong. The
definition of the term consumer includes persons to whom a
product is transferred "during the duration of an implied or
written warranty."94 Since those who give full written warran-
ties are prohibited from limiting the duration of implied war-
ranties, 5 it is obvious that the transfer of ownership of an auto-
mobile two days after a fully warranted new muffler has been
installed is a transfer during the duration of the implied war-
ranty of fitness for ordinary use regardless of the duration of the
written warranty. The duties of the warrantor run to the trans-
feree, who is a consumer. The interpretation, which is in irre-
concilable conflict with the statutory language, renders nuga-
tory a portion of the definition of the term consumer.
This regulatory response is significant because it demon-
strates that the FTC may be as cautious in its approach to
implementing the Act as Congress was in drafting it." The
extension of warranty obligations beyond the first consumer
purchaser only when a full warranty is given is typical of the
limited intervention effected by the Act. Unfair limitation of
the scope of warranty obligations is prohibited only with regard
to that narrow class of warranty documents.
The purpose of the prohibition obviously is to provide the
92. Id. This interpretation does give consumers one advantage when a full war-
ranty is limited in duration to the time when the first purchaser owns the product.
Since warranties which indicate that "this muffler is warranted so long as you own the
car in which it is installed" generally induce the purchaser to believe that proof of
purchase is not required, the Commission has adopted the position that such a warran-
tor may not require documentary proof of purchase and that the warrantor has the
burden of proving that a claimant under the warranty is not the original purchaser.
See id.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1974).
94. Id. § 2301(3) (emphasis added).
95. See text accompanying notes 134-160 infra.
96. FTC caution is evidenced by the "slow pace" at which the agency promul-
gated rules and regulations essential to full implementation of the Act. See 7 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 379, 388 (1976).
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consumer who purchases a fully warranted product a higher
measure of protection and an opportunity to realize the maxi-
mum economic benefit from his bargain. In this regard, the
prohibition constitutes an attempt to improve the bargaining
position of the consumer by providing a meaningful distinction
between full and limited warranties. A car owner who replaces
a dead battery before giving the vehicle to a relative derives no
benefit from full warranty coverage if the warranty is non-
transferable. Nor does one who invests in a grand piano that is
warranted only to the first purchaser gain much if he sells the
piano while it is relatively new. If all warrantors may limit the
scope of remedial obligations in this manner, the designation
of such an undertaking as a full warranty is unjustified.
The proposed FTC interpretation will neither promote
meaningful warranty competition nor provide a means for con-
sumers to bargain for unconditioned protection. The qualified
congressional mandate that unfair limitations be excluded is
destined to fail if the regulatory agency charged with imple-
mentation of the legislation adopts a contrary policy.
Conditional Warranty Coverage
Prohibition on conditioning. In addition to the problem of
unfair limitations on the scope of warranty obligations, imposi-
tion of onerous burdens on the consumer as a condition of war-
ranty service was a matter of considerable concern to consumer
advocates. The most frequently cited example of a burdensome
requirement was a grand piano warranty under which the man-
ufacturer agreed to repair or replace defective parts "provided
the piano is delivered to our factory ... and the transportation
costs borne by the purchaser."'" A warranty requiring the re-
turn of such a product realistically may be described as an
"illusory guarantee." 8 This problem also is addressed by the
Act on a limited basis. A full warranty may not precondition
coverage on the purchaser's assumption of duties other than
notification of a product malfunction" and making the product
97. This warranty is appended to the testimony of David A. Swankin, Washing-
ton Representative, Consumers Union, in Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8,
at 262. The manufacturer, Baldwin Piano and Organ Company, was asked to respond
to a consumer's criticism of the warranty term. Baldwin explained that the stated
condition was not unusual in the piano industry, and that the warranty was "worded
to discourage impulsive 'return to factory' of the hefty product. Id. at 261. The gist
of the reply was that the warranty did not mean what it said.
98. Id. at 137 (statement of Winston Pickett, Assoc. Counsel, Gen. Elec. Co.).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). This prohibition is subject to the
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reasonably available to the warrantor.00 It appears that requir-
ing a consumer to bear the expense of returning an electric iron
to the retailer or a nearby service facility or of mailing a ciga-
rette lighter to the manufacturer would not be unreasonable. 10'
Requiring the prepaid return of a product which is not easily
portable clearly would be unreasonable.
Another prevalent requirement of warrantors has been the
return of warranty registration cards, a practice that appar-
ently has been employed in deceptive and abusive ways. For
example, a Major Appliance Consumer Action Panel survey
indicated that twenty-eight of thirty-two companies respond-
ing would honor their warranty obligations even if a consumer
had failed to comply with the stated requirement that the reg-
istration card be returned. 02 In other words, the manufacturers
misrepresented the terms and conditions of their warranties.
The Federal Trade Commission correctly observed that a mere
declaration that the return of a registration card is a prerequis-
ite to warranty coverage "may chill the assertion and exercise
of warranty rights. . . because of the mistaken (although logi-
cal) belief that the warranty accurately states the warrantor's
intentions."''03 Moreover, the survey revealed that owner regis-
tration cards were used by manufacturers for a variety of pur-
poses, not the least of which was gathering marketing data.
The House Subcommittee staff concluded that the primary
purpose served by the requirement was market research' 4 and
proviso that other duties which a warrantor can demonstrate as being reasonable may
be imposed. The warrantor is required to demonstrate the reasonableness of any condi-
tion in an FTC rulemaking proceeding, or to be able to justify it in an administrative
or judicial enforcement proceeding, or in an informal dispute settlement proceeding.
Id.
100. An exception is made for any requirement that an aggrieved consumer
seeking refund or replacement of a product make the product available free and clear
of liens and other encumbrances. Unless the Commission determines that such a
requirement would not be practicable and promulgates a rule or issues an order prohib-
iting or limiting imposition of that duty, a seller is free to condition warranty coverage
and performance upon fulfilling that obligation. Id. § 2304(b)(2).
101. This may be viewed as part of the consumer's obligation to make the prod-
uct available to the warrantor. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 38. See generally
SENATE REPORT, supra note 57, at 25.
102. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,179 (1975).
103. Id. at 60,180.
104. The Presidential Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service also
observed that increased use of warranty registration cards reflected intense competi-
tive pressures for access to lists of potential consumers. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
8, at 9. Most manufacturers surveyed frankly admitted that the cards were used solely
as a source of marketing data. Id. at 78.
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that the use of the cards posed a threat to privacy.'"5 The FTC
has adopted an interpretation that designates a requirement
that a consumer return a registration card as unreasonable.
The Commission's position is that it is impermissible for a full
warranty expressly or impliedly to condition coverage upon
such a return.' ° However, this determination affords protection
only for consumers who receive "full" warranties.
Impact of the prohibition. As previously noted, the Act
prohibits conditioned warranty coverage only when a full war-
ranty is given. As a result, a large segment of the consuming
public may continue to endure unreasonable requirements in
order to obtain warranty coverage. The purchaser of a grand
piano still may be required to ship it back to the factory for
warranty service if only a limited warranty is given. That same
purchaser may be denied warranty coverage altogether if he
has failed to perfect his rights by returning a registration card.
The FTC is powerless to remedy either problem, except insofar
as a requirement of clear disclosure of the purchaser's obliga-
tions and the warrantor's intentions may dispel the elements
of surprise and deception.' 7
Several hypotheses may be advanced to explain this as-
pect of the legislation. First, there is the possibility that impo-
105. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,180 (1975). This concern is particularly relevant
when the consumer divulges the requested information only with the understanding
that it is necessary for perfection of warranty rights.
106. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,112, 36,116 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 700.7(b)).
The FTC, however, approved the practice of suggesting that a registration card be
returned in order to insure the purchaser of a convenient method of proving the date
of purchase of the product. Any such suggestion must be accompanied by a statement
that the failure to return the card will not affect the consumer's warranty rights. Id.
36,116 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 700.7(c)).
107. As was noted by the Senate Committee Counsel, the disclosures may be
complete but the warranty may be of no substance because of the magnitude of the
economic burden imposed upon the consumer. Consumer Product Hearings, supra
note 8, at 137 (statement of Winston Pickett, Assoc. Counsel, Gen. Elec. Co.).
The disclosure rules promulgated by the FTC require warrantors to disclose in
their warranty documents the step-by-step procedure that must be followed by con-
sumers desiring to obtain warranty service. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(5) (1977). Consumers
are entitled to be informed of the extent of their own obligations under a warranty,
including such information as a requirement that the product be shipped to the factory
at the purchaser's expense, a requirement that a sales slip and validated certificate
must be preserved to prove the date of purchase, and a requirement that the consumer
must bear some expense in connection with obtaining service under the warranty.
Similarly, warrantors who use a warranty registration card must disclose the fact that
return of the card is a condition precedent to warranty coverage. Id. § 701.4. If a
registration card appears to be an essential element of the warranty but its return is
not in fact required, then that information must be disclosed in the warranty docu-
ment.
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sition of a blanket prohibition against onerous terms might
lead to the demise of written warranties. A small manufactur-
ing concern having no network of service facilities might forego
giving written warranties if it could not condition them.' "' This
decision could reflect a fear of prohibitive costs associated with
returns to the factory or of underwriting unknown labor costs
if the producer were unable to shift the risk to the consumer
by virtue of its contract/warranty.' °" Mass merchandisers also
might consider it essential to substantially increase the price
of their products if compelled to assume the statutorily desig-
nated obligations whenever written warranties are given."" In
order to engage in effective price competition, such concerns
might shun warranties altogether."'
If an absolute prohibition against unfairly conditioning
written warranties would lead to a decrease in their availabil-
ity, the benefits obtained by disclosure requirements would be
neutralized. Rather than risking that result, the legislation
108. Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8, at 122 (statement of Nat'l Small
Business Ass'n). Statutory imposition of warranty obligations was cited by the associa-
tion as a possible barrier to market entry. Id. The Presidential Task Force reported
that manufacturers complained about the difficulty of locating qualified service agen-
cies, particularly in rural areas. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 83.
109. If required to assume the costs of labor and transportation in connection
with servicing products, the manufacturers claim that it would be impossible to antici-
pate the costs because of consumer demands for servicing parts not covered by the
warranty. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 82.
110. Anticipated increased costs generally attributed to enactment of warranty
legislation included the following: (1) frequent change of printed warranties and pro-
motional materials in order to comply with FTC rules and regulations; (2) expansion
of service capabilities in order to comply with a statutory requirement of timely repair
or replacement; (3) refund of full purchase price, including dealer's mark-up, when full
warrantor's efforts to repair fail; (4) legal fees and judgments resulting from a require-
ment that consumers be informed of their remedies. Warranties Hearings, supra note
5, at 148 (statement of George Lamb, Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of Home Appliance Mfrs.).
With regard to the latter, it was also feared that one successful class action could force
a relatively small concern out of business. Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8,
at 122 (statement of Nat'l Small Business Ass'n). A fifth and seemingly inconsistent
cost argument was that there would be a loss of sales by one who gives no warranty.
Warranties Hearings, supra note 5, at 148. This factor involves no industry loss but
rather involves only the transfer of a gain to another seller who gives a warranty.
111. The fact that this technique is often employed to stimulate sales arguably
supports industry's position that warranties should not be mandatory. See Warranties
Hearings, supra note 5, at 82 (statement of Wallace Bruener, Director & Chairman,
Warranty & Guaranty Comm., Nat'l Home Furnishings Ass'n). The consumer's range
of options is broadened when less expensive products without warranties are available.
See id. at 64-65 (statement of Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust
Div., & Virginia Knauer, Spec. Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs).
Assuming a competitive market structure, the argument is not without merit. But see
note 24 supra.
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appears to reflect the judgment that a clearly spelled out
"illusory guarantee" is better than none at all."' The Act does
not require that express undertakings be practical unless a full
warranty has been created.
A second explanation for confining the limitations on con-
ditional warranty coverage is suggested by the bifurcated ap-
proach of the legislation. Since a warranty that is required to
be captioned as "limited" might convey the notion that the
warrantor is supplying an inferior product that it cannot afford
to fully guarantee, it might be assumed that competitive forces
would provide a strong incentive for giving full warranty cover-
age." 3 In this regard, industry spokesmen expressed concern
that if market forces put pressure on all sellers to give full
warranties, the result would be a lessening of competition and
across-the-board price increases. The consumer response to
this concern was that if full warranties become prevalent, man-
ufacturers would be required to meet the minimum standards
"without pricing much consumer demand out of the mar-
ket.""' The result foreseen by consumer advocates was that
manufacturers would find it more beneficial to invest in im-
proving product quality than to invest in increasing their serv-
icing potential.
As of this writing, the experience under the Act does not
support the assumption that competitive pressures will influ-
ence warranty terms and product quality. The giving of full
warranties is the exception rather than the rule. Moreover,
within given product lines there is little competition among
what appear to be "standard warranties.""' It seems unlikely
that the regulatory scheme contained in the Act will generate
meaningful warranty competition or have substantial impact
on the substance of express obligations. It may, however, give
a competitive edge to those who assume a greater obligation to
their purchasers insofar as the designation "full waranty" may
influence the purchasing decision.
112. See text accompanying notes 128-129 infra.
113. Warranties Hearings, supra note 5, at 101 (statement of J. Edward Day,
Spec. Counsel, Consumer Elecs. Group, Elec. Indus. Ass'n).
114. 1973 Warranty Protection Hearings, supra note 25, at 100 (statement of
Prof. Leary).
115. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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REGULATION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Disclaimer and Modification
The need for regulation. Unless disclaimed, there exists in
every contract of sale by a merchant an implied warranty that
the goods are reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which
they are used."' Prior to the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss
legislation, substitution of extremely limited express obliga-
tions in lieu of implied warranties was a common practice."'
The resulting consumer hostility to this practice is attributable
to several factors: (1) written warranties containing such dis-
claimers deceptively appear to increase rather than to decrease
the rights and remedies of purchasers;" ' (2) few consumers
understand the effect of disclaimer clauses;"9 and (3) disclaim-
ers contradict representations in promotional and advertising
material. 20 Consumer advocates therefore urged adoption of a
total prohibition against disclaimers of implied warranties.
Industry strenuously objected to this proposal. Opposition
to regulating disclaimers was predicated upon the notion that
the power to negate the existence of implied warranties univer-
sally is recognized as "a basic commercial right" of contracting
parties "to freely and knowingly allocate the economic risks
relating to the quality of goods."' 21 While clear disclosure of the
terms and conditions of warranty coverage was perceived as a
valid legislative concern, governance of the substance of war-
ranties was not.'2 2 The competitive forces of the marketplace
were deemed the best mechanism for assuring a variety of con-
sumer options.'2
116. U.C.C. § 2-314.
117. See text accompanying notes 125-126 infra.
118. The Presidential Task Force characterized the major appliance warranty as
"all too frequently a fog-shrouded halo which effectively camouflages a lengthy list of
disclaimers and limitations." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 38.
119. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
120. A consumer who views a commercial demonstrating home use of a washing
machine is entitled to believe that machine to be suitable for washing clothes in the
home. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 47. A subsequent disclaimer of implied
warranties is contradictory to the representation made in the advertising.
121. Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8, at 35 (statement of James Lynn,
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Commerce).
122. Mr. Lynn characterized the economic and public policies supporting the
power to disclaim implied warranties as "entirely sound" and urged that they not be
repudiated. Id. at 37.
123. Warranties Hearings, supra note 5, at 64-65 (statement of Richard W.
McLaren, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., & Virginia Knauer, Spec. Assistant
to the President for Consumer Affairs).
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The idea that consumers are vested with power to bargain
for meaningful warranty protection not surprisingly was at-
tacked as "pure myth" by consumer advocates.2' A purchaser
has no opportunity to dicker over the terms of a manufacturer's
printed guarantee. Noting the conspicuous absence of warranty
competition in any segment of commerce other than the auto-
mobile industry, consumer groups suggested that the main dis-
tinctions among consumer product warranties rested in their
language rather than in their substance. There simply were no
free market choices to be exercised.
Moreover, the brief experience with automobile warranty
competition in the 1960's clearly revealed that escalation of
warranty coverage was used primarily as a marketing device to
promote sales.' Expanded express warranties were placed in
documents which focused on limitations on the manufacturers'
liability.2' Foremost among those limitations was the dis-
claimer of all implied warranties. In effect, the manufacturer
offered a highly conditional warranty that certain parts of an
automobile were free from defects as a substitute for an un-
conditional warranty, implied by law, that the automobile as
a unit was reasonably fit to be driven on the public highways.
This practice was a matter of concern to the FTC, which ques-
tioned its fairness. The concern stemmed from awareness that
the consuming public was powerless to influence contract
terms other than price, and from the fact that the manufac-
turers subsequently cut back the coverage of express warranties
to their 1960 level.'2
The congressional response. Consumer advocates suc-
ceeded in persuading Congress that the concept of freedom of
contract is outmoded when viewed in a mass merchandising
context. When contracts are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, rules premised upon principles of equal bargaining power
must be discarded. The resulting legislation strikes a balance
124. Consumer Product Hearings, supra note 8, at 240 (statement of George
Gordin, Senior Attorney, Nat'l Consumer Law Center at Boston College Law School).
125. FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 23. The report noted that while Chrysler
Corporation was the only manufacturer offering a long-term power train warranty "its
advertising expenditures more than doubled, a considerable portion thereof being de-
voted to advertising the warranty." Id. at 24.
126. Except for guarantees against defects, the warranty documents were de-
voted to limiting the protection in terms of time and mileage periods, limiting the
remedy for defects to repair or replacement, excluding components such as tires, and
disclaiming implied warranties. Id. at 19.
127. Id. at 20.
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between the polar options of leaving unchecked the practice of
marketing shoddy products that are accompanied by illusory
guarantees, or of making the government a partner of the con-
sumer in private contract negotiations. The solution consists of
a qualified limitation on the power of the author of the con-
tract.
Nothing in the Act prohibits a seller from disclaiming all
warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity.' 8 New products may be sold on an "as is" basis. On the
other hand, if a seller chooses to give a written warranty in a
transaction that falls within the coverage of the federal legisla-
tion, implied warranties may not be disclaimed.' The con-
sumer who purchases a product on the strength of that written
warranty has reason to expect and a right to require that the
product supplied be reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for
which it is used.
The statute, however, does not signal the creation of a
federal implied warranty of merchantability. The Act makes
clear that state law governs the circumstances under which
implied warranty obligations are imposed and that the law of
the forum also determines the quality or performance level that
impliedly warranted goods must meet.' 30 The source of state
law governing implied warranties in most jurisdictions is the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),' 3' which defines and gov-
erns the creation of implied warranties of merchantability and
of fitness for a particular purpose.'32 In some jurisdictions, the
128. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1974).
129. Id. § 2308(a). The prohibition was described as "perhaps the most signifi-
cant part of this bill." 1971 Warranty Protection Hearings, supra note 25, at 278
(statement of Edward Berlin, Gen. Counsel, Consumer Fed'n of America).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (Supp. IV 1974).
131. With the exception of Louisiana, the Uniform Commercial Code is in effect
in all jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.
132. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides that there exists in every contract for the sale of
goods by a merchant a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable, and the core
test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are
used. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 8. Section 2-315 imposes an obligation of supplying
goods which are suitable for the particular needs of the buyer when the seller has reason
to know of those needs at the time of contracting and has reason to know that the buyer
in relying on his skill or judgment to supply suitable goods. Each of these warranties
may be disclaimed or modified by sellers who comply with U.C.C. § 2-316.
A written exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability
must be conspicuous and must mention the word merchantability or use equivalent
language which makes clear that implied warranties are excluded. The implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be disclaimed or modified only by a
conspicuous writing. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
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UCC warranty scheme is supplemented by independent con-
sumer protection legislation.'33
Notwithstanding that one must look to state law in order
to ascertain whether or not an implied warranty has been cre-
ated in a given sales transaction, the Act regulates the condi-
tions under which implied warranties may be limited or modi-
fied. In addition to the absolute prohibition against disclaimer
of implied warranties if a consumer product is covered by a
written warranty,'34 the Act all but eliminates the power to
modify such warranties. A supplier who gives a "full" written
warranty is precluded from modifying implied warranty liabil-
ity.'35 A supplier who gives a "limited" written warranty is
similarly restricted, but such a warrantor may limit the dura-
tion of implied warranties to the reasonable duration of the
express warranty if the limitation is conscionable and con-
spicuous.' 3 What was intended to be accomplished by the in-
clusion of this exception is unclear.'37
133. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.5 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977); KAN.
STAT. §§ 50-623 to 643 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325.951-.954 (West Supp.
1974); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (Supp. 1974).
Some jurisdictions have strengthened consumer protection by amending the Uni-
form Commercial Code to prohibit disclaimer or modification of implied warranties in
conjunction with the sale of consumer goods. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, § 2-316(5)(Supp. 1976-77); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. art. 95B, § 2-316A (Supp. 1975); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1975). These approaches are discussed
in Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer
Protection, 23 KAN. L. REV. 567 (1975).
The federal act does not preempt this type of state consumer protection legisla-
tion. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). Consequently, warrantors who attempt
to limit the duration of implied warranties must disclose the fact that the limitation
may not be effective in some jurisdictions. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(7) (1977). See text
accompanying note 136 infra.
134. "No supplier may disclaim or modify (except as provided in subsection (b))
any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer product if... such
supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer
product .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. IV 1974). The subsection (b) reference relates
to the power granted to persons who give limited written warranties to limit the
duration of implied warranties.
135. Id. § 2304(a)(2). Full warrantors may limit or exclude consequential dam-
ages for breach of implied warranties if the limitation or exclusion appears conspicu-
ously on the face of the warranty. Id. § 2304(a)(3).
136. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(8) (1977). In conjunction with the limiting language, a
warrantor is required to disclose that the limitation may not be effective in the buyer's
jurisdiction.
137. The interpretation problems inherent in § 2308 are highlighted by a state-
ment made by Congressman Eckhart, who persistently quizzed witnesses at the hear-
ings about the application of the provision. "Frankly, I have trouble with the whole
section. I don't know precisely what it attempts to have done, and I am one of the
authors of the bill .... " 1971 Warranty Protection Hearings, supra note 25, at 187.
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Limitation of Duration
The use of the word "duration" in conjunction with the
creation of express warranties under the Act fairly connotes the
term during which a seller has undertaken an affirmative obli-
gation, e.g., "Full One Year Warranty." Disclosure of this term
is necessary to enable a purchaser to determine over what pe-
riod of time the warranty promises that the product will meet
a specified level of performance, or the period of time during
which the warrantor promises to take remedial action should
specified defects appear.
On the other hand, warranties implied by law have no
duration in the sense that the word duration is commonly un-
derstood. An implied warranty of merchantability imposes
upon the seller an obligation to supply goods which, at the time
of sale, are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are
used. Similarly, when an implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose has been created, the seller is obligated to sup-
ply goods that are suitable for the buyer's particular require-
ments at the time of sale. Duration ordinarily has meaning in
the context of implied warranty liability only insofar as the
purchaser is granted a limited period of time in which he must
discover the existence of a breach and must notify the seller
thereof,'38 and an additional limited period of time in which to
file suit in the event that the seller declines to remedy the
defect.'39 Hence, the provision in the federal act permitting
limited express warranties to limit the duration of implied war-
ranties lacks apparent meaning.
Statute of limitations theory. It has been suggested that
the reference to duration relates to the statute of limitations
governing an action for breach of implied warranty."0 Support
for this hypothesis is sought in UCC section 2-725, which
specifies that unless a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the defect must
await that performance,"' a breach occurs upon tender of deliv-
138. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) requires that a buyer notify the seller within a reasona-
ble time after the breach is or should have been discovered. Failure to comply with
this provision bars the purchaser from pursuing any remedy for the breach.
139. U.C.C. § 2-725 provides that a breach ordinarily occurs upon tender of
delivery, which event causes the statute of limitations to begin to run. A four year
period of limitation is provided by statute, but the parties may by agreement reduce
the period to a term of not less than one year.
140. See Clark & Davis, supra note 133; Saxe & Blejwas, supra note 29, at 20-
22.
141. Few warranties are held to extend explicitly to such performance, and there
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ery of the goods. Notwithstanding that a defect may be latent,
the cause of action accrues upon tender, and the purchaser has
a maximum of four years to discover the breach and commence
litigation."2 Since implied warranties do not explicitly extend
to future performance, some commentators have suggested
that "it is only logical to conclude that implied warranties have
no continued existence, i.e., no duration. By using the phrase
'duration of implied warranty,' the writers of the Act must be
referring to the statute of limitations. ' 'N 43
This rationale is not wholly persuasive. Nothing in the
federal act or its legislative history suggests any intention to
tamper with state statutes of limitation."' If one accepts this
exists a genuine "judicial reluctance to infer from the language of express warranties
terms of prospective operation that are not clearly stated." Binkley Co. v. Teledyne
Mid-America Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 279 (8th
Cir. 1972).
The term "explicit" has been defined as "not obscure or ambiguous," BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 689 (4th ed. 1951), and as "leaving nothing implied." WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 801 (unabr. ed. 1971). Cases in which warranties have been
found to be prospective include Rempe v. General Elec. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254
A.2d 577 (1969) (warranty that disposal will work properly during its lifetime); Mit-
tasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 App. Div. 2d 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1973)
(warranty that burial vault will give satisfactory service at all times); and Perry v.
Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416 (1965) (warranty that heating system will be able to
heat at 75 degrees inside when sub-zero outside temperatures exist). The soundness of
Perry has been appropriately questioned. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 342 (1972).
Representations that a product will meet a specified level of performance or is
capable of performing certain tasks do not fall within the exception unless directly
linked with a reference to a future time. A warranty that a welding machine will weld
at the rate of 1,000 feet per fifty-minute hour is breached when the seller tenders
delivery of the machine. Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-American Corp., 333 F. Supp.
at 1183. Similarly, a representation that a tractor is suitable for heavy duty plowing
relates only to a present capability of the product. Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
21 Ill. App. 3d 867, 315 N.E.2d 580 (1974).
142. U.C.C. § 2-725.
143. Saxe & Blejwas, supra note 29, at 21.
144. There were several references to statute of limitations problems during the
hearings on this legislation, but they seemed inapposite. For example, it was suggested
that:
[T]here is no settled rule of law as to when the Statute of Limitations
begins to run in the case of a breach of implied warranties .... Section
108 as it stands would necessarily create undue conflict and confusion in
the courts as to ... the time limits within which a consumer must
commence an action for [breach of warranty].
1971 Warranty Protection Hearings, supra note 25, at 183 (statement of Thomas Ni-
chol, Gen. Counsel, Gas Appliance Mfrs. Ass'n). This statement fails to take into
account the fact that in most jurisdictions the question is resolved uniformly and
statutorily by U.C.C. § 2-725. Hence, breach of an implied warranty occurs upon
tender of delivery, regardless of the purchaser's lack of knowledge of the breach. See
General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d 602 (1974); Beckmire v.
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theory, a collateral issue is raised in that the terms of a limited
warranty under the Act would provide less protection than that
afforded by state law. UCC section 2-725 permits the parties
to reduce the period in which legal action must be commenced
to a period of not less than one year. A warrantor giving a six
month limited warranty which also limited the duration of
implied warranties to six months would violate this provision
of the UCC.
Moreover, proponents of this theory seem convinced that
"duration" means the length of a warrantor's affirmative un-
dertaking when used in conjunction with express warranties,
and that it refers to the statute of limitations only when used
in conjunction with implied warranties.'45 This interpretation
would lead to an anamolous result. A cause of action accruing
in connection with a limited six month warranty, in which the
duration of implied warranties also was limited to six months,
would be governed by a four year statute of limitations if the
defect related to the express warranty. It would be governed by
a six month statute of limitations if the defect related to an
implied warranty. Absent a compelling reason which is not
apparent, adoption of this construction of the statute need-
lessly complicates newly created consumer remedies.
A theory of prospective breach. A second possible meaning
of the limitation of duration exception is that the language is
designed to impose liability for prospective breaches of implied
warranties.'45 Rather than permitting the statute of limitations
to run despite the fact that the defect is latent, the effect would
be to protect the consumer "against a subsequent defect which
he could not reasonably have been expected to discover at the
time of sale.""' 7 The language may be perceived as broadening
Ristokrat Clay Prods. Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 411, 343 N.E.2d 530 (1976); Voth v. Chrysler
Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976).
But see Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1961), discussed in text accompanying notes 149-151 infra.
See also Everhart v. Rich's, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 319, 196 S.E.2d 475 (1973); Parish
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975); Constable v. Colonie
Truck Sales, Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 1011, 325 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1971).
145. "In the case of a 'Full' written warranty the four-year limit under the UCC
presumably will continue to be the rule." Clark & Davis, supra note 133, at 611. The
other proponents of this position clearly believe that duration refers not to the length
of an obligation under a written warranty but to the statute of limitations governing
an implied warranty. Saxe & Blejwas, supra note 29, at 21.
146. Cf. Comment, Toward an End to Consumer Frustration-Making the Song-
Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Work, 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 575, 595-96 (1974) (dis-
cussion of identical language in the Song-Beverly Act).
147. Id. at 596.
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consumer rights as they exist under the UCC which "makes no
express provision for the duration of any implied warranty be-
yond the time of sale.""'4 This hypothesis suggests that the only
statute of limitations ramification is that the accrual of a cause
of action would not automatically occur on tender of delivery.
Rather it would accrue at some other time during the warranty
period, presumably when the purchaser in fact discovers or
should have discovered the breach.
There is nominal support in case law for the proposition
that implied warranties should have prospective application.
In Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co.,'49 the California Su-
preme Court squarely confronted the issue in a case arising
under the Uniform Sales Act. Hobbs, a sub-contractor, sup-
plied material and labor for a radiant heating system installed
in the concrete slab floor of a house constructed by Aced. About
a year after the date of installation, the homeowners discovered
that the tubing had developed leaks. The following year the
entire system had to be replaced, and the home owners filed
suit against Aced one year later. Aced filed a cross-complaint
against Hobbs for breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability. Among other defenses, Hobbs claimed that the breach
occurred, if at all, no later than the date of installation. Since
Aced's cross-complaint was filed more than four years after
that date, Hobbs asserted that the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. The court held that implied warranties
may be deemed prospective in nature if a defect cannot reason-
ably be discovered at the time of sale."'5 The court concluded
that the trier of fact could have determined that a reasonable
time had not elapsed when the leaks were discovered in the
radiant heating system. If that were found to be the case, the
statute of limitations was deemed not to begin to run until that
date. "'
The Magnuson-Moss Act reference to limitation of the
duration of an implied warranty suggests that the drafters may
have assumed that implied warranties are, or should be, pro-
spective in character, having a duration beyond the time that
a product is sold. In that event, the provision that such warran-
ties may be limited to the duration of express warranties of
reasonable duration might be appropriately labeled as
148. Id. at 595.
149. 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961).
150. Id. at 584, 360 P.2d at 903, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
151. Id.
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"curious." As one commentator noted: "On the necessary as-
sumption that terms implied by law are by nature reasonable,
it is difficult to see what point is served by allowing them to
be limited to the duration of express terms of reasonable dura-
tion. In both cases, a court will have to decide what is reasona-
ble."'52 Indeed the California court used as its criterion for pro-
spective breach a reasonable time.
One response to this critique might be that what consti-
tutes a reasonable duration for an express warranty may be on
the lower end of the spectrum of what constitutes a reasonable
time to discover lack of merchantability. Liability for prospec-
tive breach of implied warranties may be limited by the selec-
tion of a period of time that is reasonable with regard to the
warrantor's express undertakings. For example, if the supplier
of the radiant heating system had undertaken a limited obliga-
tion to repair or replace defective parts for a period of six
months, under the Act the length of time during which the
purchaser should discover unfitness of the system similarly
could be limited to six months. This limited obligation could
be reasonable under the Act even though it could be found
that one year after the date of installation was not an unreason-
ably long time for discovering the leaks. Under this analysis,
the cause of action would accrue when the breach was dis-
covered or upon the expiration of the express warranty term,
whichever first occurred.
This approach is not without its problems. As is true in the
case of the statute of limitations theory, the proposition that
the Act affects state statutes of limitation lacks support in the
statutory language and legislative history. The Act makes no
attempt to define when a breach occurs or when a cause of
action accrues. In the absence of express provision or legislative
history to the contrary, the Act must fairly be regarded as
leaving unaffected state policy on the appropriate period of
limitation.
If a different conclusion were reached, the statute would
pose a dichotomy similar to that flowing from the statute of
limitations theory. The accrual of causes of action for failure
to tender conforming goods would be determined by reference
to different aspects of the transaction. A cause of action for
breach of a warranty that the goods are defect-free would ac-
152. Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 41.
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crue upon tender of delivery. 5 ' Breach of an implied warranty
that the goods are fit for ordinary purposes would occur at some
later point in time, presumably when the purchaser discovered
or should have discovered the breach. Since both warranties
relate to the quality of the goods at the time of tender and
breach of the express warranty may be equally as difficult to
discover at that time as lack of merchantability, there is no
strong policy supporting this result. This is true because the
underlying reason for creating liability for prospective breaches
of implied warranties would be to afford the purchaser of an
unfit product a reasonable opportunity to discover latent de-
fects before the statute of limitations begins to run.
A theory of required manifestation. If one subtracts from
the preceding analysis the implications regarding the accrual
of a cause of action and focuses on the first element, i.e., what
constitutes a reasonable time to discover a malfunction, a fairly
logical reading of the language may be gleaned. Examination
of the problem from the perspective of consumer expectations
may be helpful. A consumer who purchases a product, espe-
cially one on which the seller has chosen to warrant one compo-
nent, is entitled to expect that the product will function reason-
ably well as a unit beyond the date of purchase.'54 The UCC
153. See note 141 supra. A typical consumer product warranty might consist of
a statement regarding product characteristics and the warrantor's agreement to make
repairs if the product malfunctions. This is not a warranty which relates to the future
performance of the goods, even though it designates a specified term during which the
warrantor has assumed an obligation. The following automobile warranty presents a
familiar example of this type of undertaking:
This vehicle is warranted against defects in material and workmanship
in normal use as follows: The entire vehicle (except tires) is warranted
for 12 months or 12,000 miles, whichever first occurs. Any part found
defective will be repaired or replaced, at the seller's option, without
charge.
See, e.g., Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 647, 545 P.2d 371, 374 (1976).
This guaranty is not an affirmation that the automobile will perform without malfunc-
tion during the period of warranty coverage. Id. at 648, 545 P.2d at 375. See also Den-
nin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Owens
v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974); 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 1257 (1971). Rather, this statement is an express warranty that the promise to
repair will be honored. The underlying assumption of such a promise is that the
product might malfunction. The statement simply establishes "a period during which
a cause of action might accrue for failure to repair or replace." Dennin v. General
Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d at 452, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 670. A cause of action for breach of
an express warranty that the seller is not tendering defective goods would accrue at
the time of tender. Thus, a distinction must be made between a suit involving a seller's
breach of post-sale obligations and a seller's breach of an express warranty by failure
to tender conforming goods.
154. Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 33.
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imposes upon a purchaser an obligation to notify the seller of
a breach "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach."'55 While the UCC scheme clearly
contemplates that the nature of the defect and the circumstan-
ces surrounding the transaction will govern the triggering of
this obligation, the parties are empowered to designate by
agreement what constitutes a reasonable time for action to be
taken, so long as the period agreed upon is not "manifestly
unreasonable.' 56
Viewing the federal act in this context, the limitation of
duration language may be read as permitting the guarantor to
fix the time within which lack of merchantability or fitness
must appear. Noting the lack of clarity in the provision, one
witness before the House Subcommittee on Commerce and
Finance suggested that this interpretation was intended and
urged amendment of the provision as follows: "Implied warran-
ties may, however, be limited in application to defects becom-
ing manifest within the period of an express warranty ....
This interpretation provides a context in which it is possi-
ble to assess the concerns of industry spokesmen and consumer
advocates alike. From the industry perspective, the shared con-
cern arose from the prohibition against disclaimer and modifi-
cation of implied warranties in conjunction with the giving of
an express warranty. Disclaimer of these warranties altogether
was a common practice.' 8 In exchange for the taking of a pre-
viously recognized right to disclaim implied warranties en-
tirely, the warrantor retains the power to contractually specify
the period of time during which the product must evidence
unmerchantable quality. That period of time may not, in any
event, be shorter than the express warranty term of reasonable
duration. An express warranty of extremely brief duration may
not be used as a vehicle for drastically limiting implied war-
155. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). The purpose of the notification requirement is to
protect the seller from stale claims and to encourage pre-litigation settlement of dis-
putes. Any notice which informs the seller that the transaction is "troublesome and
must be watched" is sufficient to open the way for negotiation between the parties.
Id., comment 4. Furthermore, the time in which consumers must act normally will be
extended beyond that afforded merchants, as the rule is designed "to defeat commer-
cial bad faith" rather than to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy. Id.
156. U.C.C. § 1-204(1).
157. 1971 Warranty Protection Hearings, supra note 25, at 183 (statement of J.
Fairfax Leary, Pub. Interest Research Group).
158. The Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service concluded that vir-
tually all major appliance warranties contained disclaimers of implied warranties.
HousE REPORT, supra note 22 at 28.
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ranty coverage. A seller may, however, define the point at
which all risks of product malfunction will shift to the pur-
chaser.
Some consumer advocates viewed this exception as an un-
justified dilution of the prohibition against disclaimer and
modification of implied warranties. "' For example, the manu-
facturer of an expensive chair may provide a one year warranty
against specified defects and limit the duration of implied war-
ranties to that one year period. While "it is possible that after
a chair has been used a year it has already served what one
should reasonably expect to be its useful period,"'60 this propo-
sition seems unlikely. Nevertheless, if the lack of merchanta-
bility did not become apparent during that period, there could
be no remedy for breach. Those who opposed the exception
expressed a preference for allowing the concept of reasonable-
ness to govern. Retention of the standard of reasonableness
would require a jury determination regarding whether or not an
upholstery fabric, which wears out after fourteen months of
moderate use, is fit for its intended purpose. This determina-
tion may be quite unrelated to the warrantor's express affirma-
tion that the springs will be durable for a period of one year.
The result of the statutory ambiguity. The preceding dis-
cussion illustrates the lack of precision with which some sec-
tions of the Magnuson-Moss Act were drafted. The absence of
an articulated policy underlying the provision permitting the
limitation of duration of implied warranties compounds the
interpretive problems. Regardless of which proferred interpre-
tation of the language is correct, it is clear that this provision
substantially diminishes the impact of the prohibition against
disclaimer and modification of implied warranties.
The problems posed by the statutory ambiguity are two-
fold. The most obvious problem is that of determining to what
extent, if any, Congress intended to broaden consumer rights
when implied warranties are "limited in duration." Equally
troublesome is the lack of guidance provided the agency
159. 1971 Warranty Protection Hearings, supra note 25, at 278 (statement of
Edward Berlin, Gen. Counsel, Consumer Fed'n of America). Congressman Eckhardt
also expressed concern and a preference for allowing the concept of reasonableness to
govern. One who contractually modifies the warranty of merchantability in this man-
ner may, "in effect, very severely limit that implied warranty to the extent of destroy-
ing it." Id. at 284.
160. Warranties Hearings, supra note 5, at 85 (statement of Wallace Breuner,
Director & Chairman, Warranty & Guaranty Comm., Nat'l Home Furnishings Ass'n).
The quoted example is that of Congressman Eckhardt.
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charged with the responsibility of interpreting and implement-
ing the Act. In the absence of clear statutory language or legis-
lative history, an aggressive regulatory policy is not likely to be
adopted. The FTC's dilemma recently emerged when it was
asked to rule on the effect of the federal legislation on state law
governing implied warranties.
Implied Warranties and State Law
The Act contains what has been described as "perhaps the
most complex formula for federal-state interaction in the con-
sumer field."'' Notwithstanding provisions specifying that
state law governing implied warranties is modified to a limited
extent, 6 ' the federal legislation expresses a policy of non-
preemption insofar as the Act might appear to abrogate con-
sumer rights or remedies under state law or other federal
laws. ' 3 Any state law which is within the scope of federal re-
quirements relating to labeling, disclosure or performance obli-
gations and which is within the scope of a requirement under
sections 102, 103 and 104 of the federal act, is inapplicable to
written warranties which comply with the requirements of the
Act unless the state requirement is identical to that of the
federal law."4 An exception is made, however, for state laws
pertaining to written warranties which provide greater con-
sumer protection than the terms of the Act. If the FTC deter-
mines, upon application of a state, that a state law does pro-
vide a higher measure of protection and that recognition of the
state requirement would not unduly burden interstate com-
merce, then the more protective state law shall be applicable
so long as the state effectively enforces it."'6 It is this exception
which provides some insight into the Commission's viewpoint
regarding the effect of the federal act upon implied warranty
liability.
Application of the formula. California was the first juris-
161. O'Neil, State Consumer Protection in a Federal System, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J.
715, 718.
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(7), 2308(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
163. Id. § 2311(b)(1). The FTC has interpreted § 111 to mean that the federal
act will not render a state requirement inapplicable to warranties meeting federal
standards unless the state requirement relates to warranty labeling or disclosure of
terms. The statutory reference to performance obligations thereunder is construed as
applicable only to "state requirements which relate to labeling or disclosure with
respect to performance under written warranties." 42 Fed. Reg. 54,004, 54,005 (1977).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
165. Id. § 2311(c)(2).
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diction to apply to the Commission for a determination that
several provisions of its warranty law afforded greater protec-
tion than those of the Magnuson-Moss legislation.' 6 The Cali-
fornia law, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act,' 7 paral-
lels its federal counterpart in many respects. Like the federal
law, the Song-Beverly Act forbids sellers who make written
warranties covering consumer products from limiting, modify-
ing or disclaiming implied warranties,'68 and it requires certain
disclosures when written warranties are made.' 9 A major point
of departure between the two laws is a provision of the Califor-
nia act which requires the duration of an implied warranty to
be coextensive with that of an express warranty if the duration
of the latter is reasonable."'7 Under the federal act, the stated
duration of an express warranty generally has no bearing on the
duration of implied warranties.'7
The FTC staff analyzed the California duration provision
in the context of the Magnuson-Moss federal-state formula.'
This analysis focused on the definition of implied warranty
which is contained in the federal act. The Commission staff
found no clear legislative intent to govern the duration of im-
plied warranties under state law, especially insofar as the fed-
eral act might be construed to extend coverage beyond the
166. 41 Fed. Reg. 28,361 (1976). Two provisions of the California legislation
relating to mobile home warranties ultimately were determined to be inapplicable to
warranties complying with the federal act. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,004 (1977).
167. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.7 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977), noted in Com-
ment, Toward an End to Consumer Frustration-Making the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act Work, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 575 (1974).
168. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793 (West 1973).
169. Id. § 1793.1 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977). A warrantor is required to clearly
state the warranty in readily understood language and to identify himself as the war-
rantor. There is no provision in the California act for the designation of warranties as
"full" or "limited."
170. Id. § 1791.1(c) (West 1973). Unlike the federal act, the California legislation
did not require the seller to specify the duration of an express warranty. In the absence
of a specified duration, the duration of implied warranties would be one year. Id.
Section 1791.1(c) also imposes a minimum duration of sixty days and a maximum
duration of one year for implied warranties that arise in connection with a sale in which
a written warranty is given. However, these designated durations apply only to new
goods. Express warranties made in conjunction with the sale of used goods give rise to
an implied warranty having a minimum duration of thirty days and a maximum
duration of three months. Id. § 1795.5(c) (West Supp. 1977).
The warranty period for both express and implied warranties must be tolled while
the product is being repaired. Id. § 1795.6(a).
171. A warrantor may, however, limit the duration of an implied warranty to no
less than that of the express warranty of reasonable duration and must state this
additional limitation in unmistakable terms. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
172. 41 Fed. Reg. 28,361, 28,362-63 (1976).
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point in time when implied warranties otherwise would be cut
off. The Magnuson-Moss provisions relating to duration of
implied warranties contain prohibitions against "warrantors"
and "suppliers" disclaiming, modifying or limiting implied
warranty coverage, but the staff could find no analogous prohi-
bition applicable to the states. The conclusion drawn was that
"the language of Section 101(7) stating that implied warranties
'arise' under state law is evidence of Congressional intent to
allow state law to govern creation and duration of implied
warranties." '
This staff analysis de-emphasized the language of several
key provisions of the federal act. The Act provides that "[t]he
term 'implied warranty' means an implied warranty arising
under State law (as modified by sections [108 and 104(a)]
.) in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer
product."' 74 The "as modified" language makes clear an inten-
tion to affect state law insofar as it conflicts with the two provi-
sions referred to in the definition. Moreover, section 108(c)
provides: "A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in
violation of this section shall be ineffective for purposes of this
title and State law." Thus, even though the Act deferred to the
states regarding when implied warranties were created, it re-
tained control of when these warranties, once created, could be
modified. The staff's conclusion on the California provision
fails to incorporate this crucial distinction.
Problems in the application of the formula. The problems
raised by the staff analysis may be illustrated by the following
warranty provisions. First:
FULL SIX MONTH WARRANTY: This product is war-
ranted against defects in material and workmanship for six
months. THIS WARRANTY IS IN LIEU OF ALL
OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
173. Id. at 28,362. In its final findings and determination of the extent to which
the Magnuson-Moss Act preempts the California legislation, the FTC limited its con-
sideration to § 111 of the federal act. The final findings did not address the staff
analysis of §§ 101, 104 & 108, discussed in the text of this article. The Commission
did not determine, therefore, whether the provision of the Song-Beverly Act regulating
the duration of implied warranties is modified by the federal act. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,004
(1977).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (Supp. IV 1974).
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In this example, the seller has purported to give a full
warranty and contemporaneously to disclaim all implied war-
ranties. In most jurisdictions this practice is permitted by
UCC section 2-316,11 but it clearly is prohibited by the fed-
eral act.' The Act specifies that no supplier may disclaim
implied warranties if he has made a written warranty and that
any such disclaimer shall be deemed ineffective for purposes of
federal and state law.' 7 UCC section 2-316 is modified and
no longer can be read to authorize disclaimers when a written
warranty which is governed by the federal act is given. Second:
FULL SIX MONTH WARRANTY: This product is war-
ranted against defects in material and workmanship for a
period of six months. ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARE
LIMITED IN DURATION TO A PERIOD ENDING SIX
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF PURCHASE.
This example poses similar problems. Sellers who give full
written warranties may not limit the duration of any implied
warranty on the product.'78 Even though such modifications
would otherwise be permitted by the UCC, the limitation is
ineffective for purposes of federal and state law and the UCC
is modified to that extent. Third:
FULL SIX MONTH WARRANTY: This product is war-
ranted against defects in material and workmanship for six
months.
This example raises the problem posed by California's
Song-Beverly Act, which provides that express and implied
warranties shall be of coextensive duration.' This provision of
the state law permits a warrantor indirectly to limit the dura-
tion of implied warranties by selecting a reasonable duration
175. But see note 133 supra.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
The issuance of a limited express warranty while simultaneously dis-
claiming implied warranties has become an increasingly common prac-
tice which results in many cases in a document which could be more
accurately described as a limitation on liability rather than a warranty.
Therefore, there is a need to prohibit the disclaimer of implied warranties
when a supplier of consumer products guarantees his products in writing.
S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). See HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at
40.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
178. Id. § 2304(a)(2).
179. This provision, of course, is subject to the requirement that implied warran-
ties may not be shorter than the minimum duration of sixty days or longer than the
maximum duration of one year in the case of new goods. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1791.1(c)
(West 1973). See note 170 supra.
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for express warranties. While this result clearly would be per-
missible under the federal act if a limited written warranty
were given,' this result may not have been intended when a
full written warranty has been given. There is no apparent
reason for permitting a warrantor indirectly to achieve the re-
sult he is forbidden from directly achieving in the preceding
example.
Although legislative history on this point is obscure, it is
believed that the intent of the federal act was to preserve re-
course against the seller if a product is not fit for ordinary
purposes, even though the term of a full express warranty may
have expired. The Senate bill contained an absolute prohibi-
tion on the limitation of the duration of implied warranties.'"'
The Senate report explained the provision as one which
"clarifies the relationship between express and implied warran-
ties on consumer products, by maintaining the independence
of one from the other."' 82 This provision was intended to put
consumers on equal footing with warrantors. "[A] consumer
whose warranty in writing for one year is unenforceable because
the warranted product malfunctioned one year and six days
after the time of purchase might still have recourse against the
supplier for warranty of fitness for ordinary use.''' 3 Although
the House amendment permitting those giving limited express
warranties to limit the duration of implied warranties was
adopted, the injunction against full warrantors remained.
Hence, the reasoning of the Senate committee should remain
applicable to full warranties.
An interpretation that the California consumer law gov-
erning implied warranties is modified to this extent would be
consonant with the federal statutory scheme, which clearly
imposes greater obligations on those who choose to give full
warranties. It is unreasonable to permit a seller, under the
guise of providing full warranty protection for a short period,
indirectly to limit the duration of the implied warranty to that
period. The underlying thesis of the federal act is that the
consumer who procures a product covered by a full warranty
has bargained for more protection than would be afforded by a
limited warranty. Insofar as unmerchantable products are con-
cerned, this is not the case under the Song-Beverly legislation,
180. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
181. S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 108(b) (1973).
182. S. REP. No. 151, 93d CONG., 1ST SEss. 21 (1973).
183. Id.
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which makes no provision for independent operation of express
and implied warranties.
The FTC's treatment of the preemption question demon-
strates again a cautious approach toward interpreting and im-
plementing the federal legislation. While general policy may be
divined from the overall structure of the Act, the Commission
is hindered by statutory ambiguities and the lack of meaning-
ful legislative history regarding the provision permitting limi-
tation of the duration of implied warranties. As long as the
statutory policy remains obscure, the regulatory policy will also
be uncertain.
Given the fact that the consumer may enforce both express
and implied warranty obligations under the Act, the question
remains whether the consumer can also collect damages which
flow from a breach of warranty.
LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY
Disclaimer of Damages
As is true in the case of other disclaimers, contract terms
which purport to limit or exclude consequential damages are
not subject to bargaining. Both forms of risk avoidance have
been employed routinely in express warranty documents which
create the impression that the seller has undertaken to extend,
rather than limit, his obligation to the purchaser.' Similarly,
the allocation of these risks is couched in legalistic jargon that
is meaningless to the average consumer.' It is obvious that
both types of exclusionary terms have a capacity to deceive,
particularly if they are incorporated in what is touted to be a
full warranty. In light of the parallel problems generated by the
practices of disclaiming implied warranties and of excluding
consequential damages, it might be assumed that the drafters
of the Act would adopt parallel approaches regarding their reg-
ulation. To the distress of consumer advocates, this is not the
case. 186
The Act contains no prohibition against exclusion or limi-
tation of incidental or consequential damages. It does, how-
ever, prohibit one who gives a full warranty from excluding or
limiting consequential damages unless the exculpatory lan-
184. See text accompanying notes 125-127 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
186. See Rothschild, supra note 29, at 364.
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guage conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty.' 7
Although there is no similar statutory provision applicable to
limited warranties, the FTC promulgated a disclosure rule that
applies to both full and limited warranties. Any limitation or
exclusion of relief must be clearly and conspicuously dis-
closed.'
Disclosure and deference reconsidered. The requirement
that warrantors conspicuously state the full extent of their obli-
gations obviously is designed to enable consumers to under-
stand their warranty rights, but its effect may be only mar-
ginal. While bold face type may draw attention to the warran-
tor's limitation of liability, only a small percentage of consum-
ers understand the effect of disclaimer clauses.
Moreover, the requirement is illustrative of the caution
with which Congress approached the regulation of warranties.
The focus is on governing the manner in which warrantors may
condition and limit their obligations, and the Act clearly is less
progressive than much state legislation. Some jurisdictions
prohibit limitations of damages for breach altogether, ' and
most declare any limitation of consequential damages for per-
sonal injuries in connection with the sale of consumer goods
prima facie unconscionable.19 Conflict between the limited
federal approach and more expansive state legislation is
avoided by provisions in the Act which specify that the federal
legislation shall not: "invalidate or restrict any right or remedy
of any consumer under State law ... 9 '[nor shall it] supersede
any provision of State law regarding consequential damages for
injury to the person or other injury."'92
In light of the Act's non-preemption of state consumer
legislation, it is clear that compliance with the federal disclo-
sure requirements may create deception. A warranty document
conspicuously excluding incidental and consequential damages
187. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1974). The Uniform Commercial Code
does not specifically require that limitations of remedies be conspicuous. U.C.C. § 2-
719.
188. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(8) (1977) (only applies to products "actually costing
the consumer more than $15.00").
189. See KAN. STAT. § 50-639(2) (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, § 2-316(5)
(Supp. 1976); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1976).
190. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3). Similarly, a few jurisdictions prohibit disclaimer,
modification or limitation of implied warranties in consumer transactions. See statutes
cited in note 133 supra.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
192. Id. § 2311(b)(2)(B).
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will lead the consumer to believe that the warrantor has accur-
ately stated his obligations."' That belief would be erroneous
if the product were sold in a jurisdiction in which such exclu-
sions are ineffective. In express recognition of the relatively
high degree of protection afforded in some jurisdictions,' the
FTC promulgated a disclosure rule designed to prevent such
deception. The rule requires that warranty documents clearly
indicate that limitations or exclusions asserted by the warran-
tor may not be effective in some jurisdictions.' 5
As in the case of warranty registration cards, promulgation
of the disclosure rule may offset the possible "chilling effect"
of declarations that deceptively appear to limit the liability of
the warrantor. More importantly, the statutory provision im-
plemented by the rule reflects congressional deference to state
protective legislation. Congress has undertaken to assure only
minimal safeguards against warranty abuses. Rather than at-
tempting to deal with the legal consequences flowing from the
sale of a defective product, the Act focuses narrowly on the
legal consequences flowing from a warrantor's failure to honor
fully his express undertakings. In light of this focus, Congress
wisely chose a supplemental scheme of legislation. The Act
leaves undisturbed state consumer law and the more compre-
hensive remedial provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code.'
193. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,177 (1975).
194. The Commission noted that California, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia had made disclaimers or exclusions unenforce-
able. Id. at 60,177 n.120. See note 133 supra.
195. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(8) (1977). A similar rule applies to limitations of the
duration of implied warranties. Id. § 701.3(a)(7).
As originally proposed, the rule would have required that warrantors who sought
to limit or exclude recovery or incidental or consequential damages name the specific
jurisdictions in which the limitation or exclusion would be inapplicable. Id. Proposed
Rules, § 701.3(k)(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 29,892, 29,893 (1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. §
701). The proposal drew sharp criticism from industry spokesmen, who characterized
the requirement as onerous. Compliance would require constant monitoring of state
law, would impose an obligation to interpret unsettled law in some jurisdictions, and
would "unduly lengthen warranties." 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,177 (1975). The objec-
tions clearly were inapposite insofar as they related to limitation or exclusion of conse-
quential damages for personal injuries. Such limitations uniformly are treated as being
prima facie unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-719(3). In response to industry objections, the
Commission amended the rule by deleting the requirement that jurisdictions in which
disclaimers and limitations are prohibited must be identified. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168
60,177 (1975).
196. Preservation of the variety of post-breach options afforded the buyer under
the UCC is extremely important. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) specifies that if circumstances
cause an exclusive remedy to fail of its essential purpose, the aggrieved party may
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CONCLUSION
As a tool for achieving consumer protection, the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is flawed. It is unfortunate that
the legislation is not drafted with the clarity demanded of war-
ranty documents. Much of the Act is obscure in purpose and
effect, and this factor has hindered the FTC in its efforts to
develop a cohesive regulatory policy.
To the extent that the Act represents an intrusion on the
operation of free market forces, the intervention is limited. The
approach of the legislation is one of providing minimal protec-
tion against warranty abuses. It does not require that sellers
warrant their wares. Sellers who refuse to give written warran-
ties avoid the reach of the disclosure requirements and the
prohibition against disclaimer of implied warranties. Sellers
who do provide written warranties are required to disclose in-
formation that may assist purchasers in understanding their
warranty rights, but it is unlikely that the information pro-
vided will enable consumers to make more intelligent purchas-
ing decisions. Those giving limited written warranties still may
include onerous terms and conditions of warranty coverage. In
this regard, the legislation cannot be characterized as
"landmark."
On the other hand, the Act should not be dubbed a total
failure. Candor has not been an attribute of many warranty
documents. Warrantors openly have misrepresented their in-
tentions and have stated the terms of their contracts in lan-
guage that is incomprehensible to consumers. Moreover, ex-
press obligations of limited efficacy consistently have been
used to strip away the protection that is afforded by operation
of law. The gilt-edged guarantee given "expressly in lieu of all
resort to any other Code remedy. A seller who limits the buyer's remedies to repair or
replacement of defective components may not rely upon that limitation if the product
remains useless after identifiable malfunctioning parts are replaced. See Cox Motor
Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966); Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d
1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
Depending on the circumstances surrounding the failure of an exclusive remedy,
the buyer may be provided alternatives under the U.C.C. that enable him to thrust
the product back on the breaching seller, to determine the manner in which damages
will be computed, and to recover incidental and consequential damages which the
seller may have attempted to disclaim. See U.C.C. §§ 2-608, 2-711 to 716. The federal
act does not contain analogous remedial provisions, but it does permit the purchaser
of a "lemon" which carries a full warranty to force the goods back on the warrantor.
After a reasonable number of unsuccessful efforts to correct a malfunction, the pur-
chaser of the fully warranted product may elect replacement or refund of the purchase
price. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1974).
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other warranties" often diminishes the rights of purchasers
while increasing their expectations. Even though the Act does
not require that express obligations be more meaningful than
they have been heretofore, it does prevent deceptive statement
of such obligations and reinstate the purchaser's right to re-
ceive a merchantable product in return for the contract price
when a written warranty has been given. Hence, a larger mea-
sure of protection, albeit implied by law, is in fact afforded.
Thus, it appears that the Act will rectify some injustices
in the marketplace. It will require a clear and accurate state-
ment of the terms of warranty coverage, and it will forbid those
who give written warranties effectively to shift all risks of prod-
uct malfunction to the consumer at the moment of purchase.
To that extent, the Magnuson-Moss Act may serve as a benefi-
cial adjunct to state consumer protection legislation.
